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TAX SUPERIORITY IN BANKRUPTCY-A STUDY OF BUSINESS
BANKRUPTCY DISTRIBUTIONS IN THE SOUTHERN AND
WESTERN DISTRICTS OF NEW YORK
The superiority accorded federal tax claims in bankruptcy
proceedings has led to criticism that the federal government is too
formidable a competitor for the assets of a bankrupt and receives
more than an equitable share of distributions.' The effects of this
superiority, however, have not been well documented. This study
of a sample of the actual bankruptcy distributions of two federal
courts, the Southern and Western Districts of New York, lends support to the critics by showing that the portion remaining in bankrupt estates after taxing authorities have taken their share is indeed
small.
I.

INTRODUCTION-THE FEDERAL TAX SUPERIORITY

Creditors' claims against a bankrupt generally fall within three
categories that determine which and how much of a bankrupt's
debts are to be paid. In the order of superiority, a claim may be
(1) secured by a valid lien,3 (2) unsecured, but given a priority
over ordinary unsecured claims, 4 or (3) unsecured and on a parity
with ordinary unsecured claims. Under the Internal Revenue Code,
5
the federal government can perfect a lien for its unpaid taxes. If

this is accomplished, the government's claim will be placed in the
first category. Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Act gives the government advantages with respect to even its unsecured tax claims: all
1. Plumb, Federal Tax Priorities in Bankruptcy and Insolvency, 78 CoM. L.J. 09
(1973).
2. However, some useful data has been compiled. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMISION
ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWvS OF THE UNITED STATES, PT. 1, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 234-35 nn. 228 & 232 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT]; D. STANLEY
& M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM (1971); Babitt & Freiman, The
Priority of Federal Claims: Selected Problems and Theoretical Considerations,24 CASE W.
Ras. L. REv. 521, 551 n.170 (1973).
3. Section 67(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1970), recognizes the
validity of statutory tax liens as qualified by section 61 (c) (3), 11 U.S.C. § 107 (c) (3) (1970).
4. See Bankruptcy Act § 64(a), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1970); text accompanying notes
18-21 infra.
5. I.R.C. §§ 6321-6323.
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except dischargeable claims0 receive a priority over the claims of
7
general unsecured creditors.
A.

Secured Claims-Creationand Status of Tax Liens
When a federal tax is demanded and not paid, section 6321 of
the Internal Revenue Code creates "a lien in favor of the United
States upon all [the debtor's] property and rights to property,
whether real or personal." 8 Such a lien arises at the time of assessment,9 although it is invalid against certain creditors, including
bankruptcy trustees, until proper notice is filed. 10
Choate liens that arise before a valid tax lien are superior to
it." Furthermore, section 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code protects the interests of certain creditors from all federal tax liens,1 2
and section 67 of the Bankruptcy Act protects bona fide purchasers.1 3 On the other hand, a federal tax lien on real property, as
well as a tax lien on personal property in the government's possession, 4 is superior to liens that arise later in time, and to inchoate
and general liens irrespective of when they arise.' 5
Where the tax lien is on personal property and is unaccompanied by possession of such property, it is subordinated not only
to superior liens, but also to claims for administrative expenses and
wages.1 Moreover, only the difference between the amount of the
tax lien and claims for administrative expenses and wages will be
6.
7.

See text accompanying notes 21-25 infra.
Bankruptcy Act § 64 (a), U.S.C. § 104 (a) (1970).

8. I.R.C. § 6321.
9. Id. § 6322.
10. Id. § 6323 (a). A trustee in bankruptcy has at least the rights of a judgment creditor under section 70 (c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110 (c) (1970). See United States
v. Speers, 382 U.S. 266 (1965).
11. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954), defines a lien as sufficiently choate if "the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount
of the lien are established." Id. at 84; United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351, 358 (1964),
aff'g 317 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1963).
12. I.R.C. § 6323 (b)- (e).
13. Bankruptcy Act § 67 (c) (1) (B), 11 U.S.C. § 107 (c) (1) (B) (1970).
14. "Constructive possession" has been held to be sufficient. Phelps v. United States,
421 U.S. 330 (1975). Phelps held that "notice of levy and demand are equivalent to seizure."
Id. at 337.
15. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 9 67.24, at 339 (14th ed., 1975) [hereinafter cited as
COLLIR] (citing United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950)).
16. See Bankruptcy Act § 67 (c) (3), 11 U.S.C. § 107 (c) (3) (1970). Section 64 (a) (1), 11
U.S.C. § 104 (a) (1) (1970), gives a priority for administrative expenses and section 64 (a) (2),
11 U.S.C. § 104 (a) (2) (1970), gives a priority to claims for wages.
The reason for the subordination is explained in H. R. REP. No. 686, 89th Cong., Ist
Sess. 1965 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT], with which the Senate Judiciary Committee
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paid before junior liens are satisfied.17
B.

Priority Claims'

Even when it is not secured by a lien-because of negligence
or failure to comply with the statutory requirements' 9-a non-disagreed. See S. REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966), reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE
CONG. 8 AD.NEws 2442.
Although new section 67c establishes more effective standards for the treatment of
statutory liens, the new section 67c (1) (B), which permits perfection by notice filing
rather than possession, may nevertheless result in the consuming of assets otherwise available for paying administrative costs and wages. This is an especially
acute problem in view of the continuing increase in the tax burden at all levels
of government. The committee believes that if the policy of the Chandler Act to
protect the costs of administration and wages is to be given effect, it is necessary
to postpone to the costs of administration and wages at least those tax liens which
are on personal property and are unaccompanied by possession. It would be grossly
unfair for the bankruptcy court and the attorneys who have labored to wind up
the bankrupt's affairs and to accumulate an estate for distribution to receive nothing for this labor. It is also socially desirable that the claims of the wage earner
who is normally entirely dependent upon his wages for the necessity of life should
be paid to the extent of the restriction in section 64a (2) before the estate is subject
to the heavy burden of all tax liens.
67.24, at 313 (quoting HousE RErORT, supra, at 7).
4 COLLIER, supra note 15,
Given the above policy, why are only those tax liens which are on personal property that
is not accompanied by possession subordinated to the costs of administration and wages?
Why should the rationale for subordination-increasingly heavy tax burdens-not be applicable as well to the claims of general unsecured creditors? See text accompanying notes 46
& 47 infra.
17. See Bankruptcy Act § 67 (c) (3), 11 U.S.C. § 107 (c) (3) (1970). The 1966 amendment
of section 67 (c) (3) has resolved the "circuity" problem that arose when a federal tax lien
that was on personal property and was unaccompanied by possession, although subordinated to other debts, was "superior to another lien on the same property arising out of
67.27, at 383.
contract, common law, or judicial proceedings." 4 COLLIER, supra note 15,
To illustrate, when you subordinate a valid tax lien to a section 64 (a) (1) or (2) priority, what do you do with a nonsubordinated lien junior to the subordinated tax lien but
superior to the section 64 priority? See id. at 382-94. See generally HousE REPORT, supra
note 16. This circuity problem was especially highlighted in In re Quaker City Uniform
Co., 238 F.2d 155 (5d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1030 (1957).
18.
Considerable confusion exists in bankruptcy administration because of a failure
to distinguish clearly between a valid lien and a right to prior payment from unencumbered assets. The former entails a right to enforcement independent of bankruptcy; it may be created by agreement or statute, or by judgment of a court. The
latter is a narrow right to payment at a certain relative point in the distribution
of a bankrupt debtor's property, naked of any power of levy or attachment; it is
a creature of the Bankruptcy Act. Quite different consequences in bankruptcy are
appended to each. A valid lien, subject to the qualifications and restrictions previously stated, is a charge against assets which must be met before distribution
to unsecured creditors begins. A right to priority accords an unsecured claim a
particular precedence over other claims in the distribution of the bankrupt's remaining assets.
3A COLLIER, supra note 15, 64.02, at 2068 (footnote omitted).
64.02, at 2068-69.
19. See 3A COL.ER, supra note 15,
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chargeable tax claim is to be paid before the claims of general unsecured creditors.20 In the scheme of section 64(a) of the Bankruptcy
Act, which establishes priorities among unsecured claims, nondischargeable tax claims stand just fourth in line, behind expenses
of administration (first priority), claims for wages (second priority),
and expenses of certain kinds of successful opposition proceedings
(third priority)21
In general, federal tax claims that have become legally due and
owing during the three-year period immediately preceding bankruptcy are non-dischargeable; conversely, taxes that became legally
due and owing prior to that period are dischargeable. 22 And be20.

See United States v. Speers, 382 U.S. 266 (1965). The court in In re Autorama

Tool & Die Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 369 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1043
(1970), noted that "[t]he Supreme Court in Speers specifically stated that the Government
retained its priority under § 64 (a) (4) even though it had no lien because of failure to
timely file notice of tax lien." Id. at 371.
21. Opposition proceedings accorded a third priority exist
where the confirmation of an arrangement or wage earner plan or the bankrupt's
discharge has been refused, revoked, or set aside upon the objection and through
the efforts and at the cost and expense of one or more creditors, or, where through
the efforts and at the cost and expense of one or more creditors, evidence shall
have been adduced resulting in the conviction of any person of an offense under
chapter 9 of Title 18, the reasonable costs and expenses of such creditors in obtaining such refusal, revocation, or setting aside, or in adducing such evidence.
Bankruptcy Act § 64 (a) (3), 11 U.S.C. § 104 (a) (3) (1970).
To qualify for a priority, a federal claim must be a "tax," and it must be "legally due
and owing by the bankrupt." Bankruptcy Act § 64(a) (4), 11 U.S.C. § 104 (a) (4) (1970). According to the leading bankruptcy treatise, priority as a "tax" has been given to almost any
statutory governmental imposition, including assessments under marketing orders, capital
stock tax, club dues taxes, gasoline taxes, income taxes, local assessments, personal as well
as real property taxes, sales taxes, unemployment compensation contributions, and water
rents. 3A COLLIER, supra note 15,
64A04, at 2172-74. In general, a tax is considered
"legally due and owing" upon assessment or at the time when the obligation to pay
accrues, not at the time when the obligation is dischargeable by payment. See New Jersey
v. Anderson, 203 U.S. 483 (1906). Moreover, the tax must be one that is legally due and
owing by the bankrupt. See, e.g., Philadelphia Co. v. Dipple, 312 U.S. 168 (1941) (debtorlessee does not have to pay as a priority taxes of lessor which lessee agreed to pay as part
of leasing agreement; such taxes are part of the consideration for the lease and are treated
in the same way as other debts owed to the lessor). Whether a tax is "legally due and
owing" and whether it is legally due and owing "by the bankrupt" are federal questions.
See New York v. Feiring, 313 U.S. 283, 285 (1941); New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U.S. at
491.
22. Bankruptcy Act § 17 (a) (1), 11 U.S.C. § 35 (a) (1) (1970). "Taxes that are dis.
chargeable under Section 17a (1) are to be paid on a parity with general unsecured claims
after all [liens and] the priorities in Section 64a have been satisfied." 3A COLUER supra
note 15, 64A02, at 2160. Federal tax claims that are not dischargeable
are placed on an equal footing within § 64, and no preference may be given to
federal over state taxes, or to state over municipal taxes; if the estate is insuffident to pay all taxes in full, a pro rata distribution is contemplated. Taxes due
the United States would be entitled to priority in bankruptcy distribution even if
§ 64 made no provision for their payment, since taxes are debts due the United
States and entitled to priority under 31 U.S.C. § 191 [§ 3466, Rev. Stat.]; but § 64
exclusively establishes priorities in bankruptcy, and gives a fourth priority to all
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cause they are considered an administrative expense, taxes that
accrue after bankruptcy receive a first priority,2 3 unless they are
withholding taxes, in which case they receive a second priority. 24
Furthermore, claims arising from penalties23 and claims composed
of interest2 6 are dischargeable regardless of when they arise.
II.

ACTUAL EFFECTS

By now the upper hand of the federal government should be
evident.2 7 But for the interests protected by section 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code and first-in-time, choate, non-federal liens, a
federal tax lien on real property or on personal property in the
government's possession is the first claim satisfied in a bankruptcy
proceeding. Federal tax liens on personal property not in the government's possession are partly satisfied before junior liens. Nondischargeable tax claims receive a fourth priority among unsecured
non-dischargeable tax claims.
Id. 64A01, at 2151-53. See also Missouri v. Ross, 299 U.S. 72 (1936); Guarantee Title &
Trust Co. v. Title Guar. c Sur. Co., 224 U.S. 152 (1912). "In only two instances do the
laws of the United States give such priority. The two instances are [§ 64 (a) (4)] and 31
U.S.C. § 191." In re Jonker Corp., 385 F. Supp. 327, 333 (D. Md. 1974).
Thus, dischargeable taxes are to be paid on the same basis as unsecured claims
not falling within any of the priorities and being paid after all of the priorities
have been satisfied. This provision makes certain that such taxes will not be
classified as debts so as to fall within the fifth priority (§ 64a (5)), and prevents
an assertion by the Government that a tax claim, even though dischargeable, is
entitled to priority by virtue of 31 U.S.C. § 191 (Rev. Stat. § 3466). The proviso
also evidences an intent by Congress that taxes not granted a priority may still be
proved as general unsecured claims.
3A COLLIER, supranote 15, 64A04, at 2176-77.
23. Generally, taxes accruing after bankruptcy are
considered a proper expense of administration of the [bankruptcy] proceeding,
entitled to a first priority under [section 64 (a)] of the Act. They are taxes incurred
while the property of the debtor was in custodia legis under the administration
of the bankruptcy court, and thus are dearly expenses of administration as that
term has long been understood.
United States v. Kalishman, 346 F.2d 514, 517 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1003
(1966); see Dayton v. Stanard, 241 U.S. 588 (1916); United States v. Sampsell, 266 F.2d 631
(9th Cir. 1959); Missouri v. Gleick, 135 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1943). See also 3A COLLIER, supra
note 15, 64.105, at 2088.
24. The theory is that the withholding taxes arise when the wages are paid. Otte v.
United States, 419 U.S. 43 (1974), af'g In re Freedomland, Inc., 480 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.
1973). Wages themselves are given a second priority under section 64(a) (2), 11 U.S.C.
§ 104 (a) (2) (1970).
25. See Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38 (1962), rev'g 287 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1961)
and United States v. Harris, 287 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1961).
26. See United States v. Kalishman, 346 F2d 514 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 1003 (1966).
27. Compare the treatment of the federal governments claims in insolvency proceedings under section 3466 of the Revenue Act of 1797, 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1970). See W. PLUMB,
FEDERAL TAx LIENS 191-201 (3d ed. 1972).
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claims. Finally, dischargeable tax claims share on a parity with the
claims of general unsecured creditors.
But what effect does all this have on actual bankruptcy distributions? To be more precise, which of the competing claimants
lose and how much better off would they have been had the federal
government been treated as an unsecured creditor? By compiling
data of actual distributions, this study aims to contribute to the
process of discovering answers to these questions, and to suggest
avenues for further research.
A.

Methodology
Clearly, the most valuable study would be a comprehensive one
covering bankruptcy distribution in all of the federal courts. Limited resources, however, have compelled a less ambitious project
here. Two courts, the Southern and Western Districts of New York,
have been chosen, solely because of their convenient location. Furthermore, sheer volume dictated three additional restrictions. First,
the study is limited to cases terminating as straight bankruptcies28
between April 1, 1975 and March 31, 1976. Second, while data from
all of the Western District cases terminating during that period are
included, the study is limited to only a sample of the Southern District cases. 29 Third, because of the large number of personal bankrultcy cases, and because such cases tend to involve small estates
with few tax problems, only business bankruptcies have been
studied.
Distinguishing business bankruptcies from personal bankruptcies presents a problem because Form J.S. 19, on which every asset
and nominal asset bankruptcy case terminating as a straight bankruptcy is reported, does not so distinguish, but merely provides a
space, captioned "In re," for the name of the bankrupt.30 For purposes of this study, therefore, a case was classified a "Business Bank28. "Straight bankruptcy" is "[a] colloquialism not found in the Bankruptcy Act, but
referring to the type of proceeding in which the bankrupt's distributable assets (if any)
are divided among creditors who have proved claims and the bankrupt may receive a
discharge." D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 2, inside cover. An "asset case" is "[a] case
in which the proceeds of nonexempt assets are sufficient to pay administrative expenses
and make some distribution to creditors." Id. A "nominal-asset case" is "[a] case in which
proceeds of nonexempt assets are consumed by payment of administrative expenses, leaving
nothing to be distributed to creditors." Id.
29. Two bankruptcy court judges of the Southern District of New York were randomly selected. All cases assigned to them which terminated as straight bankruptcies
between April 1, 1975 and March 31, 1976 are included.
30. Forms J.S. 19 are compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, D.I.S. Operations Branch.
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ruptcy" if the name was either (1) clearly that of a business, or (2)
the name of a natural person a/k/a business. A case was classified
as a "Non-Business Bankruptcy" if the name was that of a natural
person only.3 1
The tables on pages 721 through 724 present the aggregate
data of 159 cases, 76 from the Western District and 83 from the
Southern District. In an attempt to improve upon Form J.S. 19,
claims have been classified in Table I, page 721, as either: (1) secured non-tax claims; (2) secured tax claims (i.e., tax liens); (3)
administration expenses; (4) priority tax claims; (5) priority nontax claims; or (6) general unsecured claims. 2 Tables II and III,
pages 722 and 723, classify tax claims according to taxing authority.
Each table contains five columns, "A" through "E." For each
class of claims, these columns present "A," the aggregate amount
of such claims that was allowed,33 and "B," the aggregate amount
of such claims that was eventually paid. Of the aggregate amount of
such claims allowed, "C," the fraction that was eventually paid, is
easily determined by dividing "A" by "B."
31. An alternative scheme might have been employed. In addition to cases in which
the name of the bankrupt was clearly that of a business, the study might have included
all cases in which obligations of the bankrupt were greater than $15,000 as "Possible
Business-Related Bankruptcies." The reliability of such a scheme, however, would be
somewhat suspect. To aid future research, form J.S. 19 should distinguish between business and non-business bankruptcies.
32. Form J.S. 19 classifies the "Obligations of Bankrupt" as either: (1) Priority,
(2) Secured, or (3) Unsecured. Thus, to subdivide these classes, and those for "amounts
paid," it was necessary to study the worksheets attached to each form, and in many cases,
particularly in the Southern District, the dockets and case files. Because of the inherent
lack of clarity in worksheets to all but the maker, classification of claims into the six
categories mentioned in the text to this footnote may in some cases have been inaccurate,
although every attempt to assure accuracy was made, including many confrontations with
the makers. Without asserting that the classifications of data used in this study are all
necessary for the general purpose of form J.S. 19-or, on the other hand, that they are
sufficient-a further breakdown of the classifications now made on the form is recommended.
A more serious problem is that the amounts reported as "Obligations of Bankrupt"
were, although primarily the amounts allowed, sometimes the amount scheduled by the
bankrupt, and sometimes the amounts filed by the creditors. This inconsistency existed
not only between different forms, but also among the three classes noted above on a single
form. For this study, only the amounts "allowed" were considered.
To eliminate this inconsistency and add useful information, form J.S. 19 should be
amended to include for each class of obligation: (1) the amount scheduled by the bankrupt, (2) the amount filed by creditors, and (3) the amount ultimately allowed.
33. See D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 2, at 15, 127-28. The authors explain
that bankruptcy proceedings are presided over by a referee who will rule on objections
made to claims submitted by creditors. Most objections are raised by the trustees; many
creditors never bother to prove their claims at all and of the claims that are filed, many
are not fully allowed by the referee. Id. Section 7403 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code
permits the government to bring actions to enforce its liens in federal district court.
I.R.C. § 7403 (a); see W. PLUMB, supra note 27, at 254.
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For any particular class of claims, "D" is the ratio:
aggregate of claims of that particularclass allowed
aggregate of all claims allowed
The aggregate of all claims allowed is equal to the sum of column A.
Similarly, "E" is the ratio:
aggregate of claims of that particularclass eventually paid
aggregate of all claims eventually paid
The aggregate of all claims eventually paid is equal to the sum of
column B. Of course, this sum is also equal to the total amount
available for distribution from the bankrupt estates.
B.

Conclusions

The tables indicate that taxing authorities receive a substantial amount of the funds available for distribution from bankrupt
estates. Moreover, the fraction of their allowed claims that is eventually paid is much greater than that of unsecured creditors' allowed claims.
As indicated in Table I, only secured non-tax claims allowed
and administration expenses were fully satisfied. Moreover, while
totalling just over 2% of the aggregate amount of claims allowed,
together these claims received slightly more than 41 % of the total
amount available for distribution from bankrupt estates; administration expenses received 30.70% and secured non-tax claims received 10.64%. a4
Slightly over 17% of the tax liens and almost 20% of the tax
priority claims allowed were satisfied. Together, they accounted for
about 6% of the claims allowed, yet they received almost 23% of
the distribution. Whereas virtually all tax liens are federal (Table
II), about half of the priority claims are not (Table III). Most of
the non-federal priority claims are those of New York State (Table
III); most of the state priority claims are probably sales tax claims
(Table IV). '
General unsecured creditors clearly fared the worst. Only
1.83% of their allowed claims were satisfied, and while represent34. Secured non-tax claims constituted a substantially higher proportion of those
paid in the Western District (20%) than in the Southern District (9%).
5. The data in Table IV is of the Western District only. There is, of course, a
possibility that in the Southern District sales tax claims constitute a smaller fraction of
state priority claims.
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SUPERIORITY IN

BANKRUPTCY

ing about 88% of the total claims allowed, they received slightly
less than 32% of the proceeds distributed.
III.

PROFFERED RATIONALES AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Why should federal tax claims be entitled to a superiority in
bankruptcy distributions? 0 Of the several rationales that have been
of sovereign
offered, perhaps the least convincing is the notion
37
priority since it is bottomed on power, not policy.

Another rationale often asserted is the superiority's revenueraising function.38 Nowadays, however, a business may incur federal tax debts that are much larger than the debts usually incurred
when this rationale was first offered. Thus, for private creditors
"the federal priority can very often mean the difference between a
reduced recovery and no recovery at all." 39 Some of these private
creditors may not survive if they do not recover the debt. And
while the amount recovered by the federal government in its bankruptcy claims is substantial from the point of view of the unsecured
86. State and city governments may be able to justify the superiority of their claims
on the ground that they cannot absorb these losses as easily as the federal government can.
37.
The idea of sovereign priority is of ancient lineage-the Magna Carta provides, "The king's debtor dying, the king shall first be paid"-and is perhaps
originally traceable to no more profound policy than might makes right. Although
it is said that the government of the United States has no priority as a matter
of common law, and it is difficult to give a convincing reason why it should,
federal priority in fact took early root in federal legislation and has been developed by the courts in recent years to a point where the government has priority
exceeding anything enjoyed by the English crown.
Lacy, The Effect of Federal Priority and Tax Lien Legislation on Creditors of Vendors
and Purchasers,50 OREGON L. Rav. 621, 622 (1971) (footnotes omitted). See also D. STANLEY & M. GiRTH, supranote 2, at 209.
38.
Taxes are a necesssity of government, and their prompt and certain availability
is an imperious need. The tax lien, which is an exercise of Congress' constitutional
power "to lay and collect taxes," is essential to the fulfillment of this governmental
need. Consequently, private and local interests should not be permitted to undermine the exercise of this power by means of competing liens which are uncertain
in amount and which attach at an indefinite or arbitrary time to unascertained
property.
Note, Choateness and the 1966 Federal Tax Lien Act, 52 MINN. L. REv. 198, 218 (1967)
(footnote omitted) (citing Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259-60 (1965)). See Comment, 14 HASTINGS L.J. 52 (1962) (citing United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423) (1941).
See also Babitt & Freiman, supra note 2, at 552.
39. Plumb, FederalLiens and Priorities-Agendafor the Nex Decade, 77 YALE L.J.
228, 244 (1967).
In 66 of the 159 cases reported in Table I, tax claims were paid in full or in part
while unsecured claims of general creditors were paid nothing. See also cases cited note
19 supra.
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creditors, it is insignificant in comparison to the total revenue collected by the government.40
A third argument in support of the superiority is that the
government in its status as tax collector cannot choose its debtors
and therefore needs the protection afforded by the priority. However, in our economy of easy credit, private creditors may be under
competitive pressure to extend credit, placing them in a position
comparable with the government with respect to their freedom in
choosing debtors.41
Finally, note that "[t]he actual advantage the government secures from its liens and priorities is the collection of claims and
obligations from those who did not incur them"; 42 or, put more
prosaically, it tends to "rob Peter to pay Paul's taxes. '48 Moreover,
since the government draws its revenue from the entire population,
it is in a better position than any particular creditor to bear the
losses incurred in bankruptcies and perhaps should rank even after
unsecured creditors. 44
40. See CoasussioN REPORT, supra note 2, at 234-35 nn228 & 232; D. STANLEY & M.
Gmrir, supranote 2, at 130-31.
Indeed the amount involved is irrelevant. The Government must "appear to be fair"
in its dealings with others, and absent an equitable basis for such a priority, "its assertion
is viewed merely as an exercise of arbitrary power." Marsh, Trumph or Tragedy? The
Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1966, 42 WASH. L. REv. 681, 730 (1967).
41. Consider the following comments of the Canadian Study Committee on Bankruptcy Legislation:
It is, we believe, important to re-examine the public policy in respect of the
Crown priority. It must be determined whether such a priority is justified in a
modem society. Certainly, it is not necessary for the financial stability of the
government. The argument that the Crown cannot choose its own debtor has
some relevance in claims for taxes, but not, as regards contractual claims. In this
respect, it should be pointed out that individuals claiming damages do not choose
their debtors either; and yet, they do not benefit by a priority of rank. One wonders whether, in our economy of easy credit, the businessman has always the
economic freedom to choose his debtor or whether he is not bound, to a certain
point, to give credit to the same extent as do his closest competitors. It could even
be argued that the government should rank after ordinary creditors, as the public
treasury, is, in fact, in a better position than anyone to bear the inevitable losses.
The government can, in effect, divide the burden of tax left unpaid by the bankrupt among all the tax-paying public. It would be more logical for the government
to do this, than to take advantage of the bankruptcy of an insolvent taxpayer to
reimburse itself, at the expense of the creditors who have already suffered losses.
Certainly, there can be no rational explanation for the government to attempt to
obtain payment of the tax due by a bankrupt from his creditors. Such a proposition offends one's sense of justice.
COMMIssiON REPORT, supra note 2, at 216--17 (quoting STUDY ON BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY LEGISLATioN-CANADA 122-23 (1970)).
42. See Comment, supranote 38, at 52.
43. Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems (pt. 2), 13 TAx L. REv. 459,
459 (1958).
44. See CoarsnssioN REPORT, supra note 2. See also Plumb, supra note 39.
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As this study has shown, not only do federal tax claims, as

well as claims of other taxing authorities, divert a substantial
amount of the funds available for distribution from the bankrupt's

estate out of the hands of general unsecured creditors, but the advantage given to tax claims by the Bankruptcy Act results in virtually no return to unsecured creditors. While the system may have
once been justified, the superiority given to federal tax claims is no
longer tolerable.45
Two possible reforms should be considered. Congress should
either terminate the superior status given governmental tax liens
and claims or, as suggested by the Canadian Study Committee on
Bankruptcy Legislation, subordinate such liens and claims to the
claims of unsecured creditors.46

PETER D. WOLFSON

45. But see Babbit & Freiman, supra note 2, at 551-54. Based in part upon their
research, id. at 551, n.170, Babitt and Freiman conclude that it is a misimpression that
the government dominates the distribution. They support the priority based upon its
revenue raising function bolstered by (1) a sanction and deterrent function that stresses
the difficulty the government would have collecting debts from third parties who gain
possession of the debtor's property without special legislation, and (2) a ceremonial function whereby the sovereign's priority serves the psychological purpose of maintaining the
level of respect necessary for a tax system based on self-assessment to work.
However, compare Babitt and Freiman's findings with the findings of this study. It
would appear that their findings support this study's conclusions that the government
receives a substantial part of the distribution of the bankrupt's assets and that its claims
are satisfied to a much greater degree than are claims of unsecured creditors. Moreover,
neither the "ceremonial function," nor the "deterrent function" seem convincing rationales
in support of the government's priority.
46. See note 41 supra.

